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Abstract
In this paper, we examine what appropriate formulations for la-
bor exploitation are, in order to explain the emergence of class and
exploitation status in capitalist economies. Given the well-known con-
troversy on plausible formulations for labor exploitation in joint pro-
duction economies, we propose an axiom, Axiom for Labor Exploita-
tion (LE), which every formulation of labor exploitation should satisfy
to be considered ‘Marxian.’ Using this axiom, the necessary and suf-
ﬁcient condition for plausible formulations of Marxian exploitation is
characterized to verify Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle
(CECP) [Roemer (1982)]. According to this, if some labor exploita-
tion formulations, such as the well-known formulations of Morishima
(1974) and Roemer (1982; Chapter 5) are applied, CECP no longer
holds in general convex cone economies. Based upon this argument,
we propose two new deﬁnitions of labor exploitation, each of which
veriﬁes CECP as well as Fundamental Marxian Theorem (FMT).
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11 Introduction
Marxian exploitation of labor is the diﬀerence between labor hours an indi-
vidual provides and labor hours necessary to produce a consumption bundle
the individual can purchase via his income. This concept is used as an index
of ‘unjust’ distribution. That is, the existence of labor exploitation should
reﬂect the existence of ‘unjust’ distribution in some sense.
During the 1970’s and 1980’s, there were remarkable developments in the
debate about this concept in mathematical Marxian economics. Fundamental
Marxian Theorem (FMT) was originally proved by Okishio (1963) and later
named as such by Morishima (1973). FMT shows a correspondence between
the existence of positive proﬁt and the existence of labor exploitation. It
gives us a useful characterization for non-trivial equilibria, where a trivial
equilibrium is one such that its social production point is zero.12
There has also been a substantial development in the works on exploita-
tion of labor; “General Theory of Exploitation and Class” promoted by Roe-
mer (1982, 1982a). It argues that in a capitalist economy with inequal distri-
bution of productive assets, where the productive assets (capital) are scarce
relative to labor, if the labor supplied by agents is inelastic with respect to
their wealth (that is, the monetary value of their own capital), then the Class-
Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP) can hold. This argument,
which seems to support the Marxian perspective on the capitalist economy,
implies that under the inelastic labor supply condition, if the capitalist econ-
omy is under an equilibrium with positive proﬁts, then class and exploitation
status logically emerge in that economy, accurately reﬂecting inequality in
1Note that FMT was originally considered to prove the classical Marxian argument
that the exploitation of labor is the source of positive proﬁts in the capitalist economy.
However, it does not follow from FMT that the exploitation of labor is the unique source
of positive proﬁts. The reason is that any commodity can be shown to be exploited in a
system with positive proﬁts whenever the exploitation of labor exists. This observation
was pointed out by Brody (1970), Bowles and Gintis (1981), Samuelson (1982), and was
named “Generalized Commodity Exploitation Theorem (GCET)” by Roemer (1982).
2After the seminal work by Morishima (1973), there were many generalizations and
discussions of FMT. While the original FMT is discussed in simple Leontief economies with
homogeneous labor, the generalization of FMT to Leontief economies with heterogeneous
labor was made by Fujimori (1982), Krause (1982), etc. The problem of generalizing
FMT to von Neumann economies was discussed by Steedman (1977) and one solution was
proposed by Morishima (1974). Furthermore, Roemer (1980) generalized the theorem to
convex cone economies. These arguments may reﬂect the robustness of FMT.
2the distribution of wealth. That is, the wealthier agents are exploiters,a n d
they can rationally choose from all classes in society to belong to the capital-
ist class. In contrast, the least wealthy agents are exploited, and they cannot
but choose to belong to the working class: there is no other available option
for the least wealthy agents. Thus, the exploiting agents of the capitalist
class have the richest life options, whereas the exploited agents of the work-
ing class have the poorest life options: the existence of labor-exploiters and
labor-exploited reﬂects unequal opportunity of life options.3
This analysis presumed the simple Leontief-type production economy, in
which the formulation of Marxian labor exploitation was given by the Okishio
(1963) type. However, once we presume a more general convex cone econ-
omy, then the Okishio type formulation of labor exploitation is known to be
ill-deﬁned. Thus, in more general convex cone economies such as the von
Neumann economy, the issue of what is a plausible formulation for Marxian
exploitation of labor is controversial. There are two formulations for Marxian
exploitation of labor, which are well-known in the literature of mathemati-
cal Marxian economics; one is Morishima (1974), and the other is Roemer
(1982; Chapter 5). In addition to these, there are probably other potential
formulations that are plausible deﬁnitions for Marxian exploitation of labor.
G i v e nt h i sb a c k g r o u n dc o n t r o v e r s y ,i nt h i sp a p e r ,w eﬁrst propose a plau-
sible axiom, Axiom for Labor Exploitation (LE), that every formulation of
labor exploitation should satisfy to be considered ‘Marxian.’ By using this
axiom, we characterize what kinds of formulations for ‘Marxian’ labor ex-
ploitation can verify CECP as a theorem in general convex cone economies.
Based upon this characterization, we show that if Roemer’s (1982; Chap-
ter 5) or Morishima’s (1974) formulation of Marxian exploitation of labor
is applied, CECP no longer holds true in general convex cone economies.4
3This argument was criticized by some Marxian theorists, such as Bowles and Gintis
(1990) and Devine and Dymski (1991, 1992), since it assumed a standard neoclassical labor
market, which was regarded as not a real,b u ta nideal model of capitalist economies by
these critics. However, as Yoshihara (1998) showed, CECP essentially holds true even if
the neoclassical labor market is replaced by a non-neoclassical labor market with eﬃciency
wage contracts, which was interpreted as a more realistic aspect of capitalist economies
by those same critics.
4Note that Roemer (1982) argued that the epistemological role of CECP in our un-
derstanding of the capitalist economy is as an axiom, although the formal version of it
emerges as a theorem. So, if we wish to verify CECP, we must seek an appropriate model
which will preserve this principle as a theorem. By this reason, Roemer (1982) insisted
that the Roemer (1982) deﬁnition of labor exploitation is superior to the Morishima (1974)
3Moreover, we propose two new deﬁnitions of Marxian exploitation of labor,
each of which satisﬁes LE and is given as the diﬀerence between one unit of
labor supplied by an agent per day and the minimal amount of labor socially
necessary to achieve the agent’s income per day. In contrast to the two tra-
ditional deﬁnitions, CECP can be shown to hold true in general convex cone
economies under the two new deﬁnitions. We could also resolve, under the
two new deﬁnitions, most of the diﬃculties that Marxian economic theory
has faced. That is, the diﬃculty of FMT in the general convex cone economy,
that Petri (1980) and Roemer (1980) discussed, is resolved.
In the following paper, section 2 deﬁn e sab a s i ce c o n o m i cm o d e lw i t hc o n -
vex cone production technology, and also introduces the equilibrium notion
in this paper and alternative formulations, including our new deﬁnitions, for
Marxian exploitation of labor. Section 3 discusses the robustness of CECP
under the various deﬁnitions of labor exploitation in general convex cone
economies. Section 4 discusses the performance of the new deﬁnitions in
terms of FMT. Finally, section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
2.1 Production
Let P be the production set. P h a se l e m e n t so ft h ef o r mα =( −α0,−α,α)
where α0 ∈ R+ , α ∈ Rm
+ ,a n dα ∈ Rm
+ . Thus, elements of P are vectors in
R2m+1.T h e ﬁrst component, −α0, is the direct labor input of the process
α;a n dt h en e x tm components, −α, are the inputs of goods used in the
process; and the last m components, α, are the outputs of the m goods from
the process. We denote the net output vector arising from α as b α ≡ α − α.
We assume that P is a closed convex cone containing the origin in R2m+1.
Moreover, it is assumed that:
A1 .∀α ∈ P s.t. α0 ≥ 0 and α = 0, [α ≥ 0 ⇒ α0 > 0];5 and
A2 .∀ commodity m vector c ∈ Rm
+ , ∃α ∈ P s.t. b α = c.
one. Based upon this argument, which he made himself, however, the Roemer (1982) type
of labor exploitation will also be shown to be invalid, since CECP fails to hold even in the
model with the Roemer (1982) exploitation.
5For all vectors x =( x1,...,x p) and y =( y1,...,y p) ∈ Rp, x = y if and only if xi = yi
(i =1 ,...,p); x ≥ y if and only if x = y and x 6= y; x>yif and only if xi >y i
(i =1 ,...,p).
4Given such P, we will sometimes use the following notations:
P (α0 =1 ) ≡ {(−α0,−α,α) ∈ P | α0 =1 },
b P (α0 =1 ) ≡ {b α ∈ R
m | ∃α =( −1,−α,α) ∈ P s.t. α − α ≥ b α}.
As a notation, we use, for any set S ⊆ Rm, ∂S ≡ {x ∈ S | @x0 ∈ S s.t. x0 >x }.
Given a market economy, any price system is denoted by p ∈ Rm
+ ,w h i c h
is a price vector of m commodities. Moreover, a subsistence vector of com-
modities b ∈ Rm
+ is also necessary in order to supply one unit of labor per
day. We assume that the nominal wage rate is normalized to unity when it
purchases the subsistence consumption vector only, so that pb =1holds.
2.2 A Model of Accumulation and Marxian Equilib-
rium Notion
For the sake of simplicity, we follow the same setting as that in Roemer (1982;
Chapter 5). That is, our schematic model of a capitalist economy is that all
agents are accumulators who seek to expand the value of their endowments
as rapidly as possible. Let us denote the set of agents by N with generic
element ν. All agents have access to the same technology P,b u tt h e yd i ﬀer
in their bundles of endowments. An agent ν ∈ N c a ne n g a g ei nt h r e et y p e s
of economic activity: he can sell his labor power γν
0, he can hire the labor






∈ P,o rh ec a nw o r kf o r
himself to operate αν =( −αν
0,−αν,αν) ∈ P. His constraint is that he must
be able to aﬀord to lay out the operating costs in advance for the activities
he chooses to operate, either with his own labor or hired labor, funded by
the value of his endowment. He can choose the activity level of each of αν,
βν,a n dγν
0 under the constraints of his capital and labor endowments. Thus,

































5Given (p,w),l e tAν (p,w) be the set of actions (αν; βν; γν
0) ∈ P ×P ×[0,1]
which solve ν’s program at prices (p,w).
Based on Roemer (1982; Chapter 5), the equilibrium notion of this model
is given as follows:






,w h e r ep ∈ Rm
+ , w = pb =1 ,a n d
(αν; βν; γν
0) ∈ P × P × [0,1], such that:
(a) ∀ν ∈ N, (αν; βν; γν
0) ∈ Aν (p,w) (revenue maximization);
(b) α + β 5 ω (social feasibility),
where α ≡
P
ν∈N αν, β ≡
P
ν∈N β
ν,a n dω ≡
P
ν∈N ων;








(d) b α + b β = α0b + β0b (reproducibility),
where b α ≡
P









The three parts except (a) need some comments. Part (d) says that net
outputs should at least replace employed workers’ total consumption. This is
equivalent to requiring that the vector of social endowments does not decrease
in terms of components, because (d) is equivalent to ω −(α + α0b)+α = ω,
where the right hand side is the social stocks at the beginning of this period,
t h el e f th a n ds i d ei st h es t o c k sa tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h en e x tp e r i o d .P a r t( b )
says that intermediate inputs must be available from current stocks. Here, we
assume that wage goods are dispensed at the end of each production period,
therefore stocks need not be suﬃcient to accommodate them as well. Finally,
(c) is the condition of labor market equilibrium. This condition allows strict
inequality between labor demand β0 and labor supply γ0.I fi th o l d si ns t r i c t
inequality, then the nominal wage rate is driven down to the subsistence wage
w = pb =1 . If it holds in equality, then it might hold that w = pb =1 .
Let P (ω) ≡ {α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ P | α 5 ω} and
α0 (ω) ≡ max{α0 | ∃α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ P (ω)}. Then:
Proposition 1: Let b ∈ Rm
++ and α0 (ω) 5 |N|.U n d e rA 1 ,A 2 ,arepro-
ducible solution (RS) of Deﬁnition 1 exists for the economy speciﬁed above.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2.5 of Roemer (1980; 1981) that for any non-





6[Roemer (1980; 1981)] exists. (Note that QRS is deﬁned by Deﬁnition 1(a),






, which constitutes an RS under the
initial endowments (ων)ν∈N.T a k e a n y (ων)ν∈N such that for any ν ∈ N,
ων ∈ Rm
+ and α0 (ω) 5 |N|.L e t S ≡
©
p ∈ Rm
+ | pb =1
ª
.G i v e n (ων)ν∈N,
let W : S → Rn
+ such that for any p ∈ S, W(p)=( pων)ν∈N.L e t
ϕ : W(S) ³ S be a correspondence such that for any W =( Wν)ν∈N ∈ Rn
+,
p ∈ ϕ(W) implies that there exists (αν; βν; γν







is a QRS under W. Then, deﬁne Ψ ≡ ϕ◦W.
Thus, Ψ is a correspondence from S into itself.
We show that Ψ is upper hemi-continuous with non-empty, convex-compact
valued. First, it is obvious that Ψ is non-empty compact-valued. Since W
is a continuous function, it suﬃces to show ϕ is upper hemi-continuous. Let
Wµ → W as µ →∞ , pµ ∈ ϕ(Wµ) for each µ,a n dpµ → p. Suppose
p/ ∈ ϕ(W). Then, by deﬁnition of QRS, it implies that for any (α,β) with
α ≡
P
ν∈N αν and β ≡
P
ν∈N βν such that (αν; βν; γν
0) ∈ Aν (p,1) for any
ν ∈ N, b α + b β ¤ (α0 + β0)b holds. Then, for large enough µ, pµ has only
(αµ,βµ) ∈ A(pµ,1) ≡
P
ν∈N Aν (pµ,1) with b α






0 )b.T h i si s
a contradiction, since pµ ∈ ϕ(Wµ).T h u s ,p ∈ ϕ(W). Finally, we can show





























0.T a k ea n yp00 ≡ tp+
(1 − t)p0,w h e r et ∈ (0,1).S i n c eP is convex-cone, there exists b α
00N
p00 + b β
00N
p00 ∈
∂ b P (α0 =1 )such that b α
00N



















some s ∈ [0,1],a n dp00 supports b α
00N
p00 + b β
00N

















Thus, there exists (α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν
0 )ν∈N ∈ ×ν∈NAν (p00,1) under the capital




ν∈N β00ν = α00 + β00.












p0 = b,s ot h a t
b α





























= W = p0 ¡
α0 + β
0¢
and p00 = tp +( 1− t)p0.S i n c e
7α00
0 + β00
0 = u, α00
0 + β00
0 5 |N| holds, so that β00
0 5 γ00
0 = |N| − α00




is a QRS under W. This implies p00 ∈ ϕ(W).
Hence, by the Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem, there exists p∗ ∈ S such







constitutes an RS under (ων)ν∈N.
Roemer (1980, 1981) shows that, for any W ∈ Rn
+,t h e r eexists an endowment
(ων)ν∈N such that an RS exists with respect to (ων)ν∈N,i nw h i c ht h em o n -
etary values of (ων)ν∈N coincide with W. In contrast, Proposition 1 shows
that for any (ων)ν∈N ∈ Rnm
+ with
P
ν∈N ων = ω and α0 (ω) 5 |N|,a nR S
exists. Thus, the existence of an RS is shown independently of endowments,











which is the aggregate production activity actually accessed in this RS. Thus,
the pair ((p,w),αp,w) is the summary information of this RS. In the following,







2.3 Various Formulations for Marxian Exploitation of
Labor
In this subsection, we discuss a general condition that every formulation
for labor exploitation has to satisfy to be considered Marxian. Then, by
this condition, the class of plausible formulations for Marxian exploitation of
labor is identiﬁed. We show that both the Morishima (1974) and the Roemer
(1982) deﬁnitions meet these conditions. We also introduce three alternative
deﬁnitions for Marxian exploitation of labor, which also meet the condition.
In the following, we assume an RS with full employment (that is, Deﬁn-
ition 1(c) holds in equality) for the sake of simplicity. Under any such RS,
((p,w),αp,w),e v e r ya g e n tν ∈ N gets a revenue Πν (p,w) ≡ πmax (p,w)pων+
w, as Roemer (1982) shows, where
π
max (p,w) ≡ max
½
pα − (pα + wα0)
pα
| α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ P
¾
.
Given any economy hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni,a n da n yR S ,((p,w),αp,w),l e t
Nter ⊆ N, Nted ⊆ N,a n dNter ∩ Nted = ∅.A l s o , l e t B (p,Πν (p,w)) ≡ ©
fν ∈ Rm
+ | pfν = Πν (p,w)
ª
, B+ (p,Πν (p,w)) ≡
©
fν ∈ Rm
+ | pfν = Πν (p,w)
ª
,
8and B− (p,Πν (p,w)) ≡
©
fν ∈ Rm
+ | pfν 5 Πν (p,w)
ª
.L e tc ∈ Rm
+ be a vec-
tor of produced commodities. Let
φ(c) ≡ {α ∈ P | b α = c},
which is the set of the production points which produce, as net output vectors,
at least c.L e tζ ≡ ∂ b P (α0 =1 )∩ Rm
+ .T h e n :
Axiom for Labor Exploitation (LE): Two subsets Nter and Nted consti-
tute the set of exploiters and the set of exploited agents if and only if there
exist c ∈ ζ and c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )∩ Rm
+ such that pc = pc, and for any ν ∈ N,
ν ∈ N
ter ⇔∃ c
ν ∈ B− (p,Π
ν (p,w)) s.t. c
ν ≥ c and ∃α ∈ φ(c
ν) with α0 > 1;
ν ∈ N
ted ⇔∃ c
ν ∈ B+ (p,Π
ν (p,w)) s.t. c
ν ≤ c and ∃α ∈ φ(c
ν) with α0 < 1.
The axiom LE requires choosing two commodity vectors c,c ∈ Rm
+ ,e a c h
of which can be produced as a net output by supplying one unit of labor.
These c and c are considered as reference consumption bundles to identify
the income range of non-exploited non-exploiting agents: any agent ν ∈ N
with income pc 5 Πν (p,w) 5 pc, who supplies one unit of labor, is regarded
as neither exploited nor exploiting, since the amount of socially necessary
labor that he can receive from consumption through his income is exactly
one unit. Thus, if an agent ν ∈ N supplies one unit of labor and receives
Πν (p,w) <p c , then he has a consumption bundle cν ∈ B+ (p,Πν (p,w)) with
cν ≤ c such that cν is produced as a net output with less than one unit of
labor. Then, LE requires that such an agent should be deﬁned as ‘exploited.’6
The parallel argument can be also applied to the case of ‘exploiter.’ We think
all potential formulations for Marxian notion of labor exploitation should
have this property.
We can see that both the Morishima (1974) and the Roemer (1982) deﬁ-
nitions of labor exploitation, which we will provide below, satisfy this axiom.
First:
6This argument is independent of whether he really supplies one unit of labor or not,
though we now assume full employment. Even if the economy is in equilibrium with
unemployment, and an agent does not work at all, we can still apply the same argument
to identify whether he is exploited or not. In fact, we can see that if he were to supply one
unit of labor, he would receive his income Πν (p,w) from which the amount of ‘socially
necessary labor’ for his income would be identiﬁed.
9Deﬁnition 2: The Morishima (1974) labor value of commodity vector c,
l.v.(c),i sg i v e nb y
l.v.(c) ≡ min{α0 | α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ φ(c)}.
It is easy to see that φ(c) is non-empty by A2. Also,
{α0 | α =( −α0;−α;α) ∈ φ(c)}
is bounded from below by 0, by the assumption 0 ∈ P and A1. Thus,
l.v.(c) is well-deﬁned since P is compact. Moreover, by A1, l.v.(c) is positive
whenever c 6= 0,s ot h a te(c) is well-deﬁned.
Then:
Deﬁnition 3: Ap r o d u c e rν ∈ N is exploited in the Morishima (1974) sense










Given an RS, (p,w),l e tc ∈ ζ be such that pc = pc for all c ∈ ζ.A l s o ,
let c ∈ ζ be such that pc 5 pc for all c ∈ ζ.W e c a n c h e c k t h a t ν is an
exploiter in the Morishima (1974) sense if and only if Πν (p,w) >p c.A l s o ,
ν is exploited in the Morishima (1974) sense if and only if Πν (p,w) <p c .
This argument implies that Deﬁnition 3 satisﬁes LE.
In contrast to the Morishima (1974) labor value, the deﬁnition of labor
value in Roemer (1982) depends, in part, on the particular equilibrium the
economy is in. Given a price system (p,w),l e t
P (p,w) ≡
½
α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ P |









α ∈ P (p,w) | b α = c
ª
,
which is the set of those proﬁt-rate-maximizing actions which produce, as
net output vectors, at least c. Then:
10Deﬁnition 4: The Roemer (1982) labor value of commodity vector c, l.v.(c;p,w),
is given by
l.v.(c;p,w) ≡ min{α0 | α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ φ(c;p,w)}.
Then:
Deﬁnition 5: Let (p,w) be a price of RS. A producer ν ∈ N is exploited in










It is easy to verify that l.v.(c;p) is well-deﬁned, and has a positive value
whenever c 6= 0.A l s o ,l.v.(c;p) = l.v.(c) holds.





+ | ∃α ∈ φ(c;(p,w)) : α0 =1& α0 is minimized over φ(c;(p,w))
ª
.
Then, given an RS, (p,w),l e tc ∈ θ(p,w) be such that pc = pc for all c ∈ θ(p,w).
Also, let c ∈ θ(p,w) be such that pc 5 pc for all c ∈ θ(p,w).W ec a nc h e c kt h a t
ν is an exploiter in the Roemer (1982) sense if and only if Πν (p,w) >p c.
Also, ν is exploited in the Roemer (1982) sense if and only if Πν (p,w) <p c .
This argument implies that Deﬁnition 5 satisﬁes LE.
In addition to the above two deﬁnitions of labor exploitation, we also
propose two new deﬁnitions. Following Roemer (1982), we still adopt the
deﬁnition of labor value of commodities as in Deﬁnition 4. However, we
reﬁne the deﬁnition of labor exploitation from Roemer’s (1982). The ﬁrst
new deﬁnition is given as follows:











11We can see that Deﬁnition 6 satisﬁes LE by choosing c ∈ θ(p,w) as pc = pc
for all c ∈ θ(p,w),a n dc = c.
Note that minfν∈B(p,Πν(p,w)) l.v.(fν;p,w) in Deﬁnition 6 can be regarded
as the indirect labor value of ν’s income. This implies that the labor value in
Deﬁnition 6 is concerned not with an agent’s consumption vector, but rather
with an agent’s income earned. Thus, this new deﬁnition implies the fol-
lowing: Suppose an economy is under a reproducible solution ((p,w),αp,w).
Then, if the minimal expenditure of labor socially necessary to reach an agent
ν’s income Πν (p,w) under the RS, ((p,w),αp,w),i sl e s s( resp. more) than
unity, then ν is exploited (resp. exploiter). 7
The second new deﬁnition is given as follows. Given any RS, ((p,w),αp,w),
let b α
N
p,w ≡ b αp,w
α
p,w























We can see that Deﬁnition 7 satisﬁes LE by choosing c = b α
N
p,w and c = b α
N
p,w.
Deﬁn i t i o n7i sa l s oc o n c e r n e dnot with an agent’s consumption vector, but
rather with an agent’s income earned. The diﬀerence of Deﬁnition 7 from
Deﬁnition 6 is that the minimal expenditure of labor socially necessary to
r e a c ha na g e n tν’s income Πν (p,w) is given by examining the ray passing
through the actually accessed social production point αp,w solely, rather than
the minimizer over P (p,w).8 Under this deﬁnition, the following relationship
holds:
total labor employed = labor value of national income ( = net product).
7This interpretation of minfν∈B(p,Πν(p,w)) l.v.(fν;p,w) is analogous to the notion of
the minimal expenditure of wealth required to reach a given utility level in the expenditure
minimization problem of the standard micro theory of consumer behavior.
8Note also that Deﬁnition 7 is an extension of Lipietz’s (1982) formulation of labor
exploitation deﬁned in Leontief models to general convex cone models, although the back-
ground idea of his formulation is much diﬀerent from ours.
12This macroeconomic identity has been required as a basic property of labor
v a l u ei nM a r x i a ne c o n o m i ct h e o r y . 9
We may also consider a more subjective notion of labor exploitation.
Suppose that there is a representative agent of this economy, and introduce
this agent’s welfare function U : Rm
+ → R.T h i sU is continuous and strictly
monotonic on Rm
+ , and it should have the following property: for any RS,
((p,w),αp,w), b α
N






.G i v e n t h i s
welfare function U,l e tcmax
U ∈ Rm
+ be the maximizer of U (c) over ζ. Then:
Deﬁnition 8: Let ((p,w),αp,w) be an RS. A producer ν ∈ N is exploited if
and only if:
Π
ν (p,w) <p c
max
U ,
a n dh ei sa nexploiter if and only if:
Π
ν (p,w) >p c
max
U .
We can see that Deﬁnition 8 satisﬁes LE by choosing c = cmax
U and c = cmax
U .
This deﬁnition is extended from Matsuo (2004), although Matsuo provides
only the deﬁnition of exploited agents in order to discuss FMT.
3 CECP in Accumulation Economies
In the following discussion, we will examine the viability of the above ﬁve deﬁ-
nitions of labor exploitation respectively by checking whether CECP [Roemer
(1982; Chapter 5)] holds true under each of these deﬁnitions, and show that
only Deﬁnitions 6 and 7 verify CECP in general convex cone economies.
Following Roemer (1982; Chapter 5), let us deﬁne possible classes.A t
every RS in the model of section 2.2, diﬀerent producers relate diﬀerently to
the means of production. An individually optimal solution for an agent ν
at the RS consists of three vectors (αν;βν;γν
0). According to whether these
vectors are either zero or nonzero at the RS, all producers are classiﬁed into
9The macroeconomic identity is also satisﬁed by the labor value formulation of Flaschel
(1983), although his method to derive labor values is extremely diﬀerent from that of
Deﬁnition 7: in Flaschel (1983), additive labor values are derived from the square matrices
of input and output coeﬃcients, which are deﬁned by the maximally proﬁtable production
processes at a RS. In contrast, the labor value formulation in Deﬁnition 7 is given by
Deﬁnition 4. Based on Flaschel’s (1983) labor value formulation, we can consider another
formulation of labor exploitation which satisﬁes LE with c = b α
N
p,w = c.
13the following four types: that is, (+,+,0), (+,0,0), (+,0,+),a n d(0,0,+),
where “+” means a nonzero vector in the appropriate place. Here, the no-
tation (+,+,0) implies, for instance, that an agent works for his own ‘shop’
and hires others’ labor powers; while (+,0,+) implies that an agent works
for his own ‘shop’ and also sells his own labor power to others, etc.
Let us deﬁne four disjoint classes as follows:
C
H = {ν ∈ N |A
ν (p,w) has a solution of the form (+,+,0)\(+,0,0)},
C
PB = {ν ∈ N |A
ν (p,w) has a solution of the form (+,0,0)},
C
S = {ν ∈ N |A
ν (p,w) has a solution of the form (+,0,+)\(+,0,0)},
C
P = {ν ∈ N |A
ν (p,w) has a solution of the form (0,0,+)}.
We can see that the set of producers N can be partitioned into these four
classes at any RS.10
Then:
Proposition 2 [Roemer (1982; Chapter 5)]: Let (p,1) be a price of RS with





































Now, CECP, which is a principle we would like to verify, is introduced as
follows:
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP)[Roemer (1982)]:
For any economy deﬁned as in section 2, and any reproducible solution with
a positive proﬁt rate, it holds that:
10The partition of N into CH, CPB, CS,a n dCP is independent of whether the corre-
sponding RS is with full employment or not. In fact, even if the economy is in equilibrium
with unemployment, and an agent does not supply one unit of labor at all, we can still
develop a hypothetical argument that indicates what class he would rationally choose to
belong to if he were to supply one unit of labor.
14(A) every member of CH is an exploiter.
(B) every member of CS ∪ CP is exploited.
First, we discuss that under any deﬁnition of labor exploitation which
satisﬁes LE, CECP holds true if the production possibility set is given by
the Leontief technology.L e tA be an m × m non-negative, indecomposable
square matrix with input-output coeﬃcients aij = 0 for any i,j =1 ,...,m,
and L be a positive 1×m vector with labor input coeﬃcients Lj > 0 for any
j =1 ,...,m. Then, let P(A,L) ≡
©









;(ων)ν∈Ni. Then, under any deﬁnition of labor
exploitation satisfying LE, CECP holds true if and only if c ∈ ζ.
The complete proof of this theorem will be given after Theorem 2 is discussed.
Note that CECP holds under any of the ﬁve deﬁnitions of labor exploita-
tion in economies with Leontief technology, since any of them satisﬁes LE
with c ∈ ζ in those economies. Note also that in economies with Leontief
technology, Deﬁnitions 3 and 5 are equivalent.
Insert Figure 1 around here.
Figure 1 illustrates that CECP holds under Deﬁnitions 3 and 5 in a two-
goods economy with Leontief technology.
Second, we characterize, in general convex cone economies, what types of
deﬁnitions of labor exploitation satisfying LE can preserve CECP as a theo-
rem. Let Γ(p,w) ≡
©
α ∈ P (p,w) | α0 =1
ª
and b Γ(p,w) ≡
©
b α ∈ Rm
+ | α ∈ Γ(p,w)
ª
.
For any set S ⊆ Rm
+ ,l e tco{S} denote the convex hull of S,a n dcomp{S}
denote the comprehensive hull of S. Given any economy hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni,





the deﬁnition of RS. Thus, there exists αp,w∗ ∈ Γ(p,w) such that for some
t>0, tαp,w∗ = αp,w. Moreover, there exists cp,w ∈ ζ such that pcp,w = pc for
any c ∈ ζ.S i n c eb α
p,w∗ ∈ ζ by Deﬁnition 1(d), we have pcp,w = pb α
p,w∗. Then:
Lemma 1: Under A1, A2, there exists an economy hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni
which has an RS, ((p,1),αp,1), such that pcp,1 >p b α for any α ∈ Γ(p,1).
















15Deﬁne a production possibility set P(B,A,L) by
P(B,A,L) ≡
©









This P(B,A,L) is a closed convex cone in R− × Rm
− × Rm
+ with 0 ∈ P(B,A,L).
Moreover, P(B,A,L) is shown to satisfy A1 and A2.
Let ej ∈ Rm
+ be a unit column vector with 1 in the j-th component
and 0 in any other component. Then, α1 ≡ (−Le1,−Ae1,Be1), α2 ≡
(−Le2,−Ae2,Be2), α3 ≡ (−Le3,−Ae3,Be3),a n dα4 ≡ (−Le4,−Ae4,Be4).
Moreover,
b α

























Also, we have b P (α0 =1 )=co{(2,1),(1,1.5),(3,0),(0,1.75),0}.
Let b =( 1 ,1), and the social endowment of capital be given by ω =







ω,ap a i r((p,1),|N|α2) with p =( 0 .5,0.5) constitutes an RS. Note that





































pα =m a x
α∈Γ(p,1)


































+ | pc < pb α
2ª









.N o t et h a tζ+ =[ co{(1,1.5),(2,1)} ∪ co{(2,1),(3,0)}]\{(1,1.5)},
ζ− = co{(0,1.75),(1,1.5)}\{(1,1.5)},a n db α
2 =( 1 ,1.5).S i n c ecp,1 ∈ ζ im-
plies cp,1 =( 2 ,1),w eh a v epcp,1 >p b α
2. Thus, we obtain a desired result.
Insert Figure 2 around here.
16Then, the following theorem gives us a necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tion for formulations of labor exploitation satisfying LE in order to preserve
CECP as a theorem:
Theorem 2: Under A1, A2, let hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni be an economy with
an RS, ((p,1),αp,1), with πmax (p,1) > 0. Then, for any deﬁnition of labor
exploitation satisfying LE, CECP holds true under this deﬁnition if and only
if its corresponding c ∈ ζ and c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )∩ Rm
+ imply c,c ∈ b Γ(p,1).
Proof. Let hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni be an economy with an RS, ((p,1),αp,1),
such that pcp,1 >p b α for any α ∈ Γ(p,1).L e t
α
max(p,1) ≡ arg max
α∈Γ(p,1)
pα;a n dα
min(p,1) ≡ arg min
α∈Γ(p,1)
pα.




ν ∈ N | Π








ν ∈ N | π
max (p,1)pα
min(p,1) +15 Π








ν ∈ N | 1 < Π






P = {ν ∈ N | Π
ν (p,1) = 1}.
Insert Figure 3 around here.
Let H (p, b α) ≡
©
c ∈ Rm
+ | pc = pb α
ª
, H+ (p,b α) ≡
©
c ∈ Rm
+ | pc > pb α
ª
,a n d
H− (p, b α) ≡
©
c ∈ Rm
+ | pc < pb α
ª











. Then, ζ = ζ+ ∪ b Γ(p,1) ∪ ζ−.
1. Proof of the necessity.
Case 1): Consider any deﬁnition of labor exploitation satisfying LE,
and for this deﬁnition, its corresponding c ∈ ζ and c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )∩ Rm
+
have the property that c ∈ ζ+.T h u s , pc>p b α
max(p,1).S i n c e pb α
max(p,1) =





ν = ω, such that for some ν ∈ N, pc>πmax (p,1)pe ω
ν +1>
pb α
max(p,1) holds. This agent ν belongs to CH, as per Proposition 2. However,
pc>πmax (p,1)pe ω
ν +1=Πν (p,1) implies that ν is not an exploiter.
17Case 2): Consider any deﬁnition of labor exploitation satisfying LE,
and for this deﬁnition, its corresponding c ∈ ζ and c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )∩Rm
+ have
the property that c ∈ ζ−. Then, since pc = pc by LE, pc <p b α
min(p,1) holds.





ω, such that for some ν ∈ N, pc < πmax (p,1)pe ω
ν +1<p b α
min(p,1) holds.
Note that this agent ν belongs to CS, as per Proposition 2. However, pc <
πmax (p,1)pe ω
ν +1=Πν (p,1) implies that ν is not exploited.
Case 3): Finally, consider any deﬁnition of labor exploitation satisfying
LE,a n df o rt h i sd e ﬁnition, its corresponding c ∈ ζ and c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )∩Rm
+
have the property that c ∈ b Γ(p,1) and pc>p c .I fpc <p b α
min(p,1),t h e nt h e
argument of Case 2) can be applied.
In summary, the arguments of the above three cases imply that if a de-
ﬁnition of labor exploitation satisfying LE preserves CECP as a theorem,
then its corresponding c ∈ ζ and c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )∩ Rm
+ imply c,c ∈ b Γ(p,1).
2. Proof of the suﬃciency.
Since the deﬁnition of labor exploitation satisﬁes LE,t h e r ea r ec ∈ ζ and
c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )∩ Rm
+ such that pc = pc under the RS, ((p,1),αp,1).N o t e
that if c,c ∈ b Γ(p,1) under this deﬁnition of labor exploitation, then
π
max (p,1)pα
min(p,1) +15 pc 5 pc 5 π
max (p,1)pα
max(p,1) +1 .
By LE,a n ya g e n tν ∈ N with Wν under this RS such that Πν (p,1) <p c
is exploited, whereas any agent ν ∈ N with Wν under this RS such that
Πν (p,1) >p c is an exploiter. Thus, any ν ∈ CH becomes an exploiter,
whereas any ν ∈ CS ∪ CP is exploited in this economy. Thus, CECP holds
under this deﬁnition of labor exploitation.
Proof of Theorem 1: In economies with Leontief technology, b Γ(p,1) = ζ
holds. If a deﬁnition of labor exploitation satisﬁes LE with c ∈ ζ, then there
exists c,c ∈ b Γ(p,1) such that pc = pc under the RS, ((p,1),αp,1). Thus, by
Theorem 2, CECP holds under this deﬁnition.
Theorem 1 implies that any formulation of labor exploitation satisfying
LE should have c,c ∈ ζ in order to verify CECP in models with Leontief
technology, in which ζ = b Γ(p,1) holds. Since c,c ∈ ζ is independent of the
infomation about market equilibria, this characterization justiﬁes a price-
independent formulation of labor exploitation in capitalist economies with
18Leontief technology. In contrast, according to Thoerem 2, price-independent
formulations can no longer be valid in models with general convex cone tech-
nology, in which b Γ(p,1) is just a subset of ζ. In such a case, since b Γ(p,1)
is the set of net outputs produced at proﬁt-maximizing production points,
any plausible formulation of labor exploitation should be price-dependent in
order to verify CECP, which we will show below.
By the above Theorem 2, we can show that both the Morishima (1974)
and the Roemer (1982) formulations for Marxian labor exploitation cannot
preserve CECP as a theorem:
Corollary 1: Under A1, A2, CECP cannot hold under Deﬁnition 3.
Proof. Let hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni be the economy constructed in Lemma 1.
Then, this economy has an RS, ((p,1),αp,1),s u c ht h a tpcp,1 >p b α for any
α ∈ Γ(p,1). In this economy, if the Morishima (1974) formulation of labor






++ | ∃t ∈ [0,1] : c = t(2,1) + (1 − t)(3,0)
ª
.
Insert Figure 4 around here.




. Then, by Theorem 2, CECP violates under Deﬁnition
3.
Corollary 2: Under A1, A2, CECP cannot hold under Deﬁnition 5.
Proof. Let hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni be the economy constructed in Lemma 1 as
in the proof of Corollary 1. In this economy, if the Roemer (1982) formulation
of labor exploitation (Deﬁnition 6) is applied, then c =( 1 ,0) and c = b α
2.
Insert Figure 5 around here.




, by Theorem 2, CECP violates under Deﬁnition
5.
W ec a na l s os h o wt h a te v e nD e ﬁnition 8 cannot preserve CECP as a
theorem.
Corollary 3: Under A1, A2, CECP cannot hold under Deﬁnition 8.
19Proof. Let hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni be the economy constructed in Lemma 1
as in the proof of Corollary 1. In this economy, if Deﬁnition 8 is applied
as a formulation of labor exploitation, and the welfare function U of the
representative agent has the following properties: b α
N
p,1 = b α
2 and cmax
U =( 2 ,1).
Thus, c =( 2 ,1) and c =( 2 ,1).
Insert Figure 6 around here.




, by Theorem 2, CECP violates under Deﬁnition
8.
Next, we show that in general convex cone economies, CECP holds true
under Deﬁnitions 6 and 7:
Corollary 4: Under A1, A2, CECP holds true under Deﬁnition 6.
Proof. Given an RS, (p,1),l e te c ∈ θ(p,1) be such that pe c = pc for all c ∈ θ(p,1).
Note that in Deﬁnition 6, c = e c and c = e c.S i n c ee c ∈ b Γ(p,1) by deﬁnition,
the desired result follows from Theorem 2.
Insert Figure 7 around here.
Corollary 5: Under A1, A2, CECP holds true under Deﬁnition 7.
Proof. Note that in Deﬁnition 7, c = b α
N
p,1 and c = b α
N
p,1.S i n c eb α
N
p,1 ∈ b Γ(p,1)
by deﬁnition, the desired result follows from Theorem 2.
Insert Figure 8 around here.
There may potentially be another formulation of labor exploitation which
satisﬁes LE and the condition c,c ∈ b Γ(p,1). For instance, we can consider
a formulation of labor exploitation based on the labor value formulation of
Flaschel (1983), as discussed in footnote 7. In this case, since the labor value
of b α
N
p,1 is unity under Flaschel’s (1983) formulation, the corresponding labor
exploitation can be formulated to satisfy LE with c = b α
N
p,1 = c. Then, CECP
holds under this formulation. Except for this formulation, however, at least to
the best of my knowledge in the current literature of mathematical Marxian
economics, there are no other explicit formulations of labor exploitation than
Deﬁnitions 6 and 7, which satisfy LE with c,c ∈ b Γ(p,1). In this sense, each
of Deﬁnitions 6 and 7 could represent one of the most plausible formulations
for Marxian exploitation of labor.
204 FMT in general convex cone economies
In this section, we discuss that the new formulations of labor exploitation
given by Deﬁnitions 6 and 7 resolve the well-known diﬃculty in FMT under
joint production economies. Let us consider an economy hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni
in which there is a partition N1 and N2 of the society N.T h a ti s ,N1∪N2 = N
and N1 ∩ N2 = ∅. Let us assume that for any ν ∈ N1, ων ∈ Rm
++,a n df o r
any ν ∈ N2, ων = 0. Furthermore, every agent ν ∈ N1 is assumed to engage
solely in operating βν ∈ P so as to maximize his proﬁtr e v e n u e ,w h e r e a s
every agent ν ∈ N2 is assumed to engage solely in selling γν ∈ [0,1] so as to
maximize his wage revenue.
In such a framework, Morishima (1974) showed that if the economy is
under the von Neumann balanced growth equilibrium, then the warranted
proﬁtr a t e 11 is positive if and only if the Morishima (1974) labor exploitation
is positive (that is, l.v.(b) < 1). However, Petri (1980) and Roemer (1980)
showed that if the economy is under the RS, then FMT cannot hold: there
i sac a s et h a tt h emaximal proﬁtr a t eis positive under no exploitation in the
sense of Morishima (1974) (that is, l.v.(b)=1 ). Furthermore, Roemer (1980;
1981) showed that the following assumption is the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for FMT to hold true under the RS and the Morishima (1974) labor
exploitation:
A3 .(Independence of Production) ∀(−α0,−α,α) ∈ P, ∀b α = 0,a n d∀0 5
c ≤ b α, ∃(−α0
0,−α0,α0) ∈ P s.t. α0 − α0 = c and α0
0 < α0.
This assumption is rather strong, since every production set having inferior
production processes is eliminated by it. Moreover, just excluding such pro-
duction sets is not the real resolution since the failure of FMT occurs in
production sets with inferior production processes.
However, if the Morishima (1974) labor exploitation is replaced by our
Deﬁnitions 6 and 7, then, without A3, FMT can hold true even under RS.
The following theorems illustrate this:
Theorem 3: Under A1, A2, let ((p,1),αp,1) be a reproducible solution
(RS). Then, the RS yields positive total proﬁts if and only if every worker in
N2 is exploited in the sense of Deﬁnition 6.
11That is, the minimal value of uniform proﬁt rates. See Morishima (1974) for a more
detailed discussion.





































Since p ∈ Rm
+ and b α
p,1 = α
p,1
0 b by Deﬁnition 1(d), the last strict inequal-
ity implies b α
p,1 ≥ α
p,1
0 b.L e t f ∈ Rm











































< 1,s ot h a t
every worker is exploited in the sense of Deﬁnition 6.
(⇐): Since there is no RS with a negative total proﬁt, it suﬃces to
discuss only the case of zero proﬁt. Let ((p,1),αp,1) be an RS with a zero







=0 .B yD e ﬁnition 1(d), b α
p,1 = α
p,1
0 b.L e t
f ∈ Rm
+ be such that pf = pb and α
p,1
0 f = tb α










0 f = tb α




holds whenever p>0. Note for this RS, ((p,1),αp,1),a n yp r o ﬁt-maximizing
production points α0 ∈ P (p,1)∩∂P (α0 =1 )has the property that pb α
0 =1by







This implies for any f ∈ Rm
+ such that pf = pb, l.v.(f;p,1) = 1 holds.




=1 , so that no worker is exploited in the
sense of Deﬁnition 6.
If p ≥ 0,i tm a yb et h ec a s et h a tb α
p,1 ≥ α
p,1
0 b and b α
p,1 6= α
p,1
0 b.H o w -







=0and {βν}ν∈N1 constitutes a proﬁt-maximizing
production plan at p, b ∈ ∂ b P (α0 =1 )holds. By the same argument as
above, for any f ∈ Rm





=1 , so that no worker is exploited in the sense of
Deﬁnition 6.
Theorem 4: Under A1, A2, let ((p,1),αp,1) be a reproducible solution
(RS). Then, the RS yields positive total proﬁts if and only if every worker in
N2 is exploited in the sense of Deﬁnition 7.
22The proof of Theorem 4 is analogous to that of Theorem 3, and we therefore
omit it.
Note that FMT cannot hold under RS if the labor exploitation is given by
t h eR o e m e r( 1 9 8 2 )t y p e( D e ﬁnition 5 in this paper). This diﬃculty cannot
be resolved even if A3 is imposed. The proof is easily obtained by considering
the economy that we constructed in the proof of Lemma 1. (See Figure 2.)
In that economy, we can see that l.v.(b;p,1) = 1, that implies every worker
is not exploited in the sense of Roemer (1982), though the maximal proﬁt
rate is positive under the RS of that economy. Since that economy satisﬁes
A3, we obtain the proof of the above statement.
Note also that FMT cannot hold true in general convex cone economies
with heterogeneous consumption demands of workers if the deﬁnition of labor
exploitation is either the Morishima (1974) type or the Roemer (1982) type.
We can see that this diﬃculty is also resolved under Deﬁnitions 6 and 7, a
detailed discussion for which is presented by Yoshihara (2006).
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
As shown in the theorems in this paper, we characterized the condition for the
plausible formulation of labor exploitation to verify CECP, and also proposed
two new deﬁnitions of labor exploitation, each of which performed well in
terms of both FMT and CECP. However, the new deﬁn i t i o n sh a v ee x c l u s i v e l y
distinct characteristics in comparison with the previous deﬁnitions such as
Morishima (1974) and Roemer (1982), which may give us new insights on
the Marxian theory of labor exploitation and the theory of labor value.
First, Roemer (1982) claimed that prices should emerge logically prior to
labor values so as to preserve CECP as a theorem in general convex cone
economies. Though he did not succeed in proving this claim with his own
price-dependent labor value formulation (Deﬁnition 4 in this paper), Theo-
rem 2 in this paper proves that his claim itself is true. In fact, in order to
verify CECP as a theorem, any formulation of labor exploitation satisfying
LE should be price-dependent, as we discussed in section 3. This implies
that the classic transformation problem in Marxian economic theory is no
longer worth investigating, since any price-independent labor value formula-
tion causes the failure of CECP. In other words, according to Theorems 1
and 2, the scope of the classical Marxian perspective on labor exploitation,
that the exploitative relationship between capital and labor was considered
23to be logically independent of which prices constitute an equilibrium in the
capitalist economy,12 should be limited to models with Leontief technology.
Second, in the orthodox Marxian argument, labor exploitation was ex-
plained by using the concept of the labor value of labor power. The labor
value of labor-power could be deﬁned in the Morishima (1974) framework
as the minimal amount of direct labor necessary to produce the subsistence
consumption vector as a net output. This could be accepted by orthodox
Marxism as the formulation of the socially necessary labor time to reproduce
labor power. In such an argument, the subsistence consumption vector plays
a crucial role in the formulation of the labor value of labor power. In Deﬁni-
tion 6 of this paper, however, the labor value of labor power might be deﬁned
as the minimal amount of direct labor socially necessary to achieve workers’
income by which they can respectively purchase at least the subsistence con-
sumption vector. Also, in Deﬁnition 7, the labor value of labor power might
be deﬁned as the minimal amount of direct labor socially necessary to achieve
workers’ income, which is evaluated via the actually used social production
path. In both of these formulations, the subsistence consumption vector is
used, at most indirectly,t od e ﬁn et h el a b o rv a l u eo fl a b o rp o w e r .T h u s ,t h e
labor value of labor power also no longer emerges logically prior to the price
of labor power (wage income). Hence, the concepts of labor value in these
new deﬁnitions are completely irrelevant to theories of exchange values of
commodities and labor power.
In spite of such a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of these new deﬁnitions from the
orthodox Marxian notion of labor exploitation, they would be justiﬁed, ac-
cording to the scenario Roemer (1982) oﬀered, since both FMT and CECP
hold true for these new deﬁnitions. Note that we still need a further con-
ceptual argument about which of Deﬁnitions 6 and 7 is more appropriate
formulation for Marxian notion of labor exploitation. We leave this for fu-
ture occasions.
Note that there have been recently some papers published, such as Skill-
man (1995) and Veneziani (2007), which address the issue of whether the
class and exploitation structure is (logically) persistent or not in the long
run. They argue that if savings are explicitly introduced in an intertemporal
setting, then positive proﬁts and exploitation tend to disappear over time.
12In the classical Marxian perspective on the capitalist economy, the phenomenon of
market movements was regarded as one reﬂection of the so-called class struggle between
capital and labor, and the rate of labor exploitation was considered to measure the strength
of the class struggle.
24Though we did not address this issue in this paper, because we worked only
on a temporary equilibrium model, it is worth commenting on it. As Skillman
(1995) and Veneziani (2007) pointed out, the introduction of savings without
population growth easily diminishes the scarcity of capital relative to labor
in accumulation economies, which makes capital accumulation drive proﬁts
and the rate of exploitation to zero over time. To take the issue of persistent
exploitation seriously, we should introduce, in addition to savings, the fac-
tor of population growth explicitly in an intertemporal model, as Skillman
(1995) and Veneziani (2007) also pointed out. This kind of perspective is also
shared with the classical Marxian argument for the progressive production of
a relative surplus population, and it is beyond the scope of this paper. The
objective of this paper is not to discuss the persistence of exploitation, but to
discuss, under the presumption of market equilibrium with positive proﬁts,
what appropriate formulations of labor exploitation are, in order to explain
the emerging mechanism of class and exploitation in capitalist economies.
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Figure1: Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle holds under Definitions 3 
and 5 in economies with Leontief technology   2
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Figure 4: The Morishima (1974) definition for 
Marxian Labor Exploitation meets LE , but 
violates  CECP. 
2 ˆ α
( ) ,1 Pp
























Figure 5: The Roemer (1982) definition for Marxian 
Labor Exploitation meets  LE, but violates  CECP. 
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Figure 6: Definition 8 for Marxian Labor 
Exploitation meets  LE, but violates  CECP. 
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Figure 7: Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle in a general convex cone 
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Figure 8: Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle in a general convex 
cone economy when the formulation of exploitation is given by Definition 7.
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